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Emerging decentralised electricity systems require new approaches to energy governance. As energy
sources shift and technology evolves, electricity governance is shifting from largely centralized models to
include multiple decentralised and multi-level sites not bounded in their operations by established
democratic processes. New forms of accountability are required to ensure that multi-level electricity
systems meet societal needs and expectations. While multi-level governance dynamics are new for many
electricity systems, they are common across other resources (e.g. water). This article uses an OECD
framework that synthesizes decades of research on multi-level natural resource governance to describe
12 principles for “good” resource governance. These principles are developed and applied to decen-
tralising electricity governance contexts in order to develop mechanisms, and identify potential gover-
nance gaps, that are relevant for ensuring accountability in decentralised electricity governance systems.
The nature of decentralised electricity systems particularly highlights the need to rescale many gover-
nance functions, while paying attention to issues of inclusion, capacity building, coherence, adaptiveness,
and transparency.
© 2020 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Decentralisation is a defining feature of the ongoing energy
transition. Fuelled by falling technology costs, rising concern over
climate change, and social innovation opportunities, electricity
generation in particular is moving away from largely predominant
centralized models [1].1 While decentralisation presents many
technical, environmental and social opportunities [2e4], it also
introduces governance challenges [5,6]. The increasing proportion
of decentralised electricity generation assets in supply mixes
means that there are many more actors playing important roles in
energy systems. These new dynamics complicate the tasks ofis not consistent across all
ralised systems in Berlin and
olation.
vier on behalf of KeAi
ing by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Keauthorities accountable for ensuring adequate, clean, and afford-
able electricity for society. The objective of this paper is to draw
upon insights from decentralised natural resource governance
contexts to developmechanisms, and identify potential governance
gaps, that are relevant for ensuring accountability in decentralised
electricity governance systems.
Accountability in governance is the allocation, acceptance and
demonstration of responsibility for actions and decisions [7,8]. In
contemporary electricity governance, accountability mechanisms
evolved in step with centralized generation models [5,9]. Central-
ized models involve a limited number of generation assets that
produce power that flows to consumers through a centrally
controlled grid. If governance is defined as the actions and de-
cisions taken regarding a particular resource [10], then the number
of actors directly involved in centralized electricity governance
systems is relatively constrained. Governing tasks are usually
handled centrally by a system regulator, in consultation with in-
dustry actors, and under policy direction from a democratically
elected government. Chains of accountability are well established,
and relatively clear [6].
Decentralised electricity systems have a fundamentally differentAi Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
2 Electricity is made of up electrons that move through physical wires. When
numerous, uncoordinated generators and users are impacting the flow of electrons
on the grid, then there are implications for the voltage and frequency of electricity.
Uncoordinated fluctuations in voltage and frequency can negatively affect the
stability of the system. Fluctuations in voltage and frequency are usually monitored
and controlled by utilities who make use of various technological approaches to
ensure system stability. However, with increased decentralisation of generation, the
maintenance of system stability requires much more technical intervention. This
can include placing constraints upon electricity producers, users and prosumers
[102].
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many consumers shift to being “prosumers” (i.e. those who both
produce and consume electricity), electricity systems are increas-
ingly characterized by a mix of centralised and decentralised gen-
eration assets. This requires new governance models. Decentralised
governance can be structured in many ways. However, all iterations
involve a rescaling of governing activities, and an increase in both
the number of actors and in overall system complexity [12,13]. This
has implications for how accountability for the generation and
provision of electricity is ensured.
Widespread decentralisation of supply is a relatively new
development in modern electricity contexts. However, there are
many resources for which a mix of centralised and decentralised
supplies have long been used to meet critical societal needs. For
example, water is often provisioned through a mix of central re-
sources (e.g. pipelines that feed water from the Colorado River to
California farmers), city- and town-level distributions systems, and
private or semi-private wells. The entire system is coordinated by
accountable, centralised authorities in amulti-level, nestedmanner
in order to ensure that people and businesses have a safe, secure
and reliable supply of water. While the comparison between water
and electricity resources is certainly not perfect (discussed below),
the extensive scholarship on how to accountably governmulti-level
resources such as water holds important insights for the gover-
nance of a decentralising electricity system.
This paper draws upon the rich literature on accountability in
nested, multi-level and participatory water governance systems to
develop mechanisms, and identify potential governance gaps,
relevant for decentralised electricity governance. It first establishes
the basis e and limitations e for comparing water and electricity
resource governance systems for the purposes of ensuring
accountability. It then reviews the concept of “accountability” in
the context of nested, multi-level and participatory governance.
The article then introduces the (2015) Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles for “good” water
governance. The principles were explicitly designed to address
challenges of accountability and other critical “governance gaps”.
The next section briefly introduces a case of multi-level water
governance in Ontario, Canada that will be used to ground the
OECD principles in empirical reality. After that, the OECD principles
are described, and then discussed as relevant e or not e for
accountable electricity governance. The article closes with an
overview of relevant mechanisms and gaps.
2. Comparing water and electricity governance
Water governance is highly studied both because it is an
essential societal resource, and because it tends to function as a
“common pool” resource (CPR). These are resources for which users
are in competition (i.e. the resource is finite), it is not possible to
exclude others from the resource, and users are interdependent. As
a result, the actions of one user have implications for the ability of
others to use or benefit from the resource. When the behaviour of
individual actors participating in the system impacts the entire
system, governance must coordinate across these actors [14].
In such CPR contexts, governance tends to be “multi-level”.
Multi-level governance requires the coordination and cooperation
of actors at multiple levels [15]. A specific variant of multi-level
governance is “nested” governance. This is governance that oc-
curs “in the shadowof hierarchy” [16]. Nested governance, adapting
a definition from resource governance contexts, is “a mechanism to
provide social benefits through decentralised and community-
based [resource] management, while addressing causes and con-
sequences of social, [ecological, and technical] issues crossing
spatial and jurisdictional scales” [17]:59). It is common where acentral government or authority has formal accountability for
ensuring access to a resource. There are clear, formally codified
relationships delineating governing tasks and responsibilities.
However, decentralised decision-making units retain a significant
measure of autonomy [18,19].
Centralised electricity systems have not traditionally assumed
the characteristics of CPRs. Among other reasons, users of the
electricity grid were not interdependent; that is, their actions and
decisions did not directly impact the ability of their neighbours to
use the grid. User actions and decisions were (and often still are)
mediated by a central authority, independent of other users.
However, the proliferation of grid-connected decentralised gener-
ation resources has changed the nature of the grid use, with clear
implications for governance. This is for two main reasons:
First, trends toward decentralisation and prosumption mean
that people in close geographical proximity can be in competition
for “space” on the grid.2 Additionally, locally produced electricity
can be in short supply, creating the need for back up from thewider
system. This type of situation e where coordination is required
amongst geographically close actors who are linked by common
infrastructure e begins to resemble governance architectures
associated with common pool resources like water.
Second, the emerging grid architecture e where a high fraction
of decentralised renewables is incorporated into the supply mix e
is optimised through local level coordination. Many recommen-
dations for future grid architecture include local coordination of
electricity supply and demand (e.g. Refs. [11,20]. This will help to
capture predicted benefits from local electricity generation
including local economic development [21], and limiting the
transmission losses that accumulate as electricity is transported
over distances [2]. Local coordinating bodies are envisioned to act
as nodes that communicate with the wider electricity system to
ensure system balancing and security of supply. As with CPRs such
as water, it will be necessary to coordinate governance of electricity
across multiple nested governing bodies, including local electricity
bodies.
As electricity systems evolve, they are becoming increasingly
suited to multi-level, nested governance approaches. These ap-
proaches are well developed in research on CPRs such as water
[22,23]. It is therefore useful to examine best practices for the
governance of decentralised resources in order to determine how
much of this applies to electricity systems, and how it can be best
utilised to ensure effective and accountable electricity system
governance.3. Accountable electricity governance
Accountability is the allocation, acceptance and demonstration
of responsibility for actions and decisions [7,8]. This means that,
wherever there is an accumulation of power over consequential
actions and decisions, there is contingent responsibility for the
consequences of those actions and decisions [24]. This definition of
accountability holds despite widespread confusion over what the
term “governance” actually means. For some, governance
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by actors beyond the state (e.g., firms, charities) (e.g. Stoker 1998;
Rhodes 1996). For others, governance is the performance of gov-
erning actions (e.g., making decisions and taking actions on a
particular topic), regardless of who is involved (e.g. Kooiman 2003
[105]). This means that governance could be performed solely by
state actors, or solely by non-state actors. In modern resource
systems, governance almost involves a mix of state and non-state
actors e with consequences for who is accountable.
As electricity governance begins to incorporate more actors into
decision-making processes, there are at least two significant im-
plications for accountability; one relating to accountability mech-
anisms, and the other to the location of accountability itself. First,
when governance expands beyond state actors, the traditional
checks and balances that help ensure accountability may no longer
be as relevant [24]. For example, in centralised electricity systems,
governments have assumed roles as the primary accountable gov-
erning authority. In liberalised economies, they often delegate re-
sponsibilities to an arms-length regulator. By coordinating with a
limited number of private generation companies, usually in re-
lationships governed by legal contracts, regulators are able to
control and ensure system reliability. If private companies do not
fulfil their responsibilities, they are held accountable by contrac-
tually defined penalties [25]. If governments fail to provide reliable
and cost-effective supply, they are held accountable through
traditional democratic mechanisms (i.e. elections). These standard
accountability relationships are disrupted when responsibility for
actions and decision-making is diffused, as it is in decentralised
governance contexts [24]. The electorate may still hold a govern-
ment accountable (e.g. for electricity access), but, absent appro-
priate mechanisms, the government may no longer have the
capacity to control relevant actions and decisions. This renders
these accountability mechanisms less effective.
The second consequence for accountability is that decentrali-
sation can make governing activities less transparent because there
are so many decision-making nodes. As Van Kersbergen and Van
Waarden (2004:158) note, “Where decision making becomes less
transparent, it is less [easy] to locate loci of power, to identify where
decisions are being taken and who is responsible.” This challenge
has led to a wide range of conceptualisations of accountability in
decentralised governance systems.
One popular conceptualisation that has been applied to energy
is that of “polycentric” governance (e.g., Ref. [5]. Polycentricity as-
sumes multiple autonomous centres of decision making. In purely
polycentric situations, there are no formally enforceable account-
ability mechanisms [7,19,26]. For example, bodies like the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have
limited capacity to sanction deviant members and must rely on
external accountability mechanisms like reputation or limiting
access to resources [27]. Accountability of this type is referred to as
“external” and is a common characteristic of polycentric gover-
nance arrangements.
Rather than polycentricity, grid-connected decentralised gen-
eration is better characterised as a nested, multi-level governance
arrangement (e.g. Refs. [28,29]. With some exceptions, the system
that is emerging in most jurisdictions is of an increasing number of
low tomedium capacity renewable energy (RE) generators, some of
whom both produce and consume electricity (i.e. prosumers) but
who remain connected to a centralised grid that also includes large
generation assets [1,30]. Because a grid connection is required,
participation in electricity grids is not autonomous and does allow
regulators to apply sanctions for bad behaviour (e.g. disconnection
from the grid, financial penalties). This type of accountability
structure is referred to as “internal” accountability [31]. It is
possible that external accountability mechanisms like reputationalpressure will play a stronger role in future electricity system
governance e for example, in the case of small scale microgrids e
but formal internal accountability mechanisms are understandably
more attractive and reliable for democratically accountable gov-
ernments e and are currently sufficient in situations of grid-
connected generation assets.
Perhaps obviously, there is still significant uncertainty about
how electricity governance can best ensure legitimate, accountable,
equitable, and effective outcomes for evolving electricity systems. It
is already clear that ambiguity about who is responsible for
governance decisions can lead to public opposition to decentralised
renewables, as well as problems securing financing from nervous
investors [32]. In water governance contexts, the move to expand
the range of governing actors beyond government led to a focus on
the concept of “good governance”. The next section describes how
accountability relates to good governance, and describes the com-
ponents of good governance as relevant for decentralised electricity
systems.
4. Accountable, “good” governance
The concept of ‘good governance’ is prominent in literature that
examines participatory multi-level governance (Innes et al. 2007
[104]; [24,33]). In the context of CPRs like water, ‘good governance’
is intended to help meet a number of criteria with both instru-
mental and normative implications that are viewed as desirable
with respect to resource governance. These include parameters
such as accountability, legitimacy and inclusion (de Lo€e and
Kreutzwiser 2007). To illustrate, we both normatively desire
accountable governance, at the same time as accountability is
required to ensure that resource systems function optimally. The
entanglement of normativity and functionality is inherent in
participatory governance systems intending to produce just,
effective and sustainable outcomes.
In 2015, the OECD hosted a participatory forum to synthesize
decades of research and best practices in water governance into a
set of ‘good governance’ principles. These principles recognize that
governance is always context dependent but that there are
consistent themes that provide a useful framework for analysis
across contexts [34]:18). For the OECD, good governance for water
is:
the range of political, institutional and administrative rules,
practices and processes (formal and informal) through which
decisions are taken and implemented, stakeholders can articu-
late their interests and have their concerns considered, and
decision-makers are held accountable for water management
[35].:5)
Accountability is foregrounded in this discussion as both a
precondition for, and outcome of, good governance. It is also one of
the seven overlapping “multi-level governance gaps” that the OECD
good governance principles are designed to address (the others
being policy, funding, capacity, information, administration and
objectives) [34]. The forum settled upon 12 interdependent
governance principles organized across 3 dimensions: effectiveness,
efficiency, and trust and engagement (Fig. 1).
The next sections review these 12 principles, organized under
the three dimensions, with special attention to their relevance for
accountable decentralised governance. Empirical examples are
used to clearly illustrate these principles. The examples are drawn
from a case of nested, participatory water governance focused on
the protection of drinking water sources in Ontario, Canada [36,37].
A brief review of the context and data collection methods for the
Ontario case are first provided. The governance principles are then
Fig. 1. OECD principles on water governance (after [35].
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governance.4.1. Decentralised water governance in Ontario, Canada
In 2006, the province of Ontario, Canada introduced the Clean
Water Act (CWA) to address widespread governance failures. These
failures culminated in a 2001 fatal incidence of municipal drinking
water contamination. The CWA provisioned for the creation of local
collaborative “Source Protection Committees” populated by civil
society, businesses, and local and provincial government. The 19
provincial committees were tasked with using deliberative pro-
cesses to create locally-tailored “Source Protection Plans” to govern
activities with implications for drinking water sources. As a CPR,
drinking water supplies across the province were impacted by a
range of uses including agriculture (e.g. groundwater withdrawals
for irrigation, access of cattle to streams), manufacturing, private
wells, contamination from roads (e.g. road salt), small business (e.g.
leakage of gas or chemical tanks), and personal uses (e.g. applica-
tion of pesticides in recharge areas). This broad range of activities is
the result of actions and decisions taken by many different indi-
vidual actors. It required that the province, as the accountable au-
thority, adopt a more participatory, multi-level approach than had
previously been used.
The CWA processes were designed to correspond to what was
then best practice in water governance [38]. They built heavily on
the (2003) precursor document to the [35] water governance
principles. As a result, they provide many clear examples of what
effective nested, multi-level governance looks like in practice.
These examples are useful for designing decentralised electricity
governance systems. The next section reviews the 12 OECD prin-
ciples, organised using the 3 dimensions of effectiveness, efficiency,
and trust and engagement. Examples from the Ontario case are
used to provide empirical grounding. Each dimension is then
explored in the context of accountable decentralised electricity
governance in a separate subsection.4.2. Empirical data collection
The empirical examples from the Ontario case are drawn from a
study examining issues of power in participatory water governancecontexts where large industrial actors are active. Data for that study
were generated using 41 semi-structured interviews of govern-
ment officials, process participants and staff, industry actors and
external experts; 92 relevant process documents; and, observations
collected during participatory process meetings, site visits and in-
terviews. These data were analysed using a theoretical framework
grounded in theory on power, participation and governance
through a process of analytic induction [39]. Further details on data
sources and the methodological approach for the Ontario study can
be found in Refs. [37,40].5. Accountability over three dimensions of good governance
5.1. Effective governance
According to the OECD, effective governance requires decisions
at appropriate scales, a clear delineation of responsibilities, suffi-
cient capacity, and coherent policies. Much resource governance
embraces principles of ‘subsidiarity’ where governance is devolved
to the lowest appropriate level with the capacity to undertake
governing functions [18]. This is often desirable because it means
that governance decisions are better matched to local contexts, and
incorporate local knowledge [14].
In situations where new local authorities are formed to under-
take governance tasks, group formation is a highly resource
intensive process. To reduce the burden of this task, new groups are
often formed around existing structures. For example, the CWA in
Ontario introduced legislation to devolve relevant aspects of
drinking water governance to Source Protection Committees. These
Committees were hosted by existing Conservation Authorities who
received financial support from, and had formal reporting and
accountability mechanisms back to, government [37]. The use of
existing bodies as building blocks for new nested governance ar-
rangements is also common in other contexts (e.g. Ref. [41]).
The decentralisation of governance activities with significant
societal and legal consequences (e.g. energy provision, supply of
freshwater) also usually requires that the legally accountable entity
retains formal decision-making power through clear delineation of
roles and responsibilities [42]. For example, when Ontario tasked
Source Protection Committees with the creation of Source Protec-
tion Plans, they retained the responsibility for reviewing all plans,
often sending specific decisions back to committees for renegotia-
tion before finally signing off on them. While there were concerns
that the control exerted by the province over the plans was
excessive, this governance arrangement made use of local knowl-
edge and resources to govern a decentralised system that the
government was unable to effectively manage themselves, while
retaining formal accountability. It is also relevant that the province
heavily support committees members in developing the capacities
required to make evidence-informed decisions about how to pro-
tect water sources [37,43,44].
Any devolution of responsibilities requires that those with new
decision-making responsibilities have the capacities required to
fulfil those responsibilities [8,23,45]. Literature on participatory
resource governance has delved deeply into issues of capacity and
there are a number of typologies of different capacities (e.g.
Refs. [23,46]. An encompassing concept of “community capacity”
has also evolved to represent the diverse capacities required to
effectively govern resources at nested levels. According to
Ref. [47]):1104):
…while community capacity encompasses a variety of founda-
tional resources or assets (e.g., physical, financial, human) upon
which a community can draw in times of need, community
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assets toward social or institutional change.
Therefore, community capacity is not just access to different
skills and types of knowledge (e.g. knowledge of policy processes,
knowledge of watere or electricitye resources), but also the ability
to work constructively together toward a common purpose.
Unlocking knowledge that is held by diverse actors is often part
of the justification for implementing decentralised governance ar-
rangements [48]. However, these knowledges, and related capac-
ities are not evenly distributed and often correspond to existing
societal power imbalances [49]. Capacity building in the form of
workshops or information sessions is often required to make sure
that all those with decision-making authority are able to make or
recommend decisions from a reasonably informed perspective. In
the Ontario example, participants collectively decided on the areas
where they required capacity building (e.g. groundwater hydrology,
cooperative decision-making). The province provided resources to
ensure that these capacity needs were met [50].
The advantages of locally-led governance of resources are also
balanced by risks. There is a common and somewhat natural ten-
dency for local bodies to lose sight of the entire system and how
local actions and decisions will affect others [15]. The role of a
central overseeing authority, in addition to holding formal demo-
cratic responsibility for a resource, is to take a larger systems view
and ensure coherence and coordination of policies [51,52]. Policy
coherence requires that policy objectives, instruments, and
implementation practices are aligned toward overall system opti-
misation across vertical and horizontal scales, as well as internally
[53]. In decentralised systems, what is best for the local level may
not be best for the wider system for which authorities hold formal
accountability. However, negotiating this requires negotiating
trade-offs (discussed in the next section). Most nested multi-level
governance arrangements benefit from some form of central
oversight to balance local concerns for local solutions with the in-
terests of the larger population [54]. A central body may devolve
considerable autonomy and authority to decentralised bodies but
should have a clear structure in place for ensuring negotiation of
best overall system functioning [18].5.2. Effective governance for decentralised electricity systems
Issues of scale, delineation of responsibility, capacity and policy
coherence are equally as important for emerging electricity
governance. In the source water protection example, re-
sponsibilities were devolved to existing Conservation Authorities.
However, the decentralised nature of electricity systems is a new
development in many places. Decentralisation has emerged
because advances in renewable energy technologies have allowed
widespread decentralised electricity production [5]. Even in loca-
tions where electricity was previously decentralised (i.e. Berlin),
much of the associated physical and institutional infrastructure is
no longer in place [55]. Because the modern decentralised elec-
tricity system is emergent, there are not usually existing, long
standing energy-focused institutions comparable to water boards
or conservation authorities. Instead, municipalities [56], or other
established alternative local entities (e.g. eco-communities, tran-
sition towns) are playing a key role [57,58].
In many jurisdictions, municipalities have existing authority to
make some decisions about energy. For example, powers related to
land use planning, zoning, building codes and infrastructure siting
are often already devolved, clearly delineated, and entrenched in
planning laws [59]. Many municipalities are pursuing a more active
role in energy systems and using the powers they do have tosupport local RE development [60]. For example, the City of London
has developed a suite of initiatives to enable cheap access to solar
panels for citizens, the development of RE by local neighbourhood
associations, a fund to support community energy development,
and various mechanisms to support RE use and development in city
owned infrastructure and services [61]. While not all cities have the
institutional capacity of London, the surge of municipal interest in
electricity is well documented [62].
Despite the logic of scale, municipalities are not always
empowered to take an active role in electricity decentralisation. In
Ontario, until 2019, the Green Energy and Economy Act provided the
provincial government with the power to overrule municipal ob-
jections to the siting of specific electricity projects [63]. This type of
centralised decision-making was justified based on government
concerns over coherence and accountability. However, this
approach has proven politically unpopular both from those seeking
to stop large scale RE developments in their region, and those
seeking to develop RE technologies with the support of their local
municipality [64]. The resulting social conflict highlights the
importance of making appropriate decisions about effective
governance related to scale and the allocation of roles and
responsibilities.
Accountable governance requires a clear delineation of roles and
responsibilities. Bodies holding decentralised authority in nested
governance arrangements must themselves have some way of
ensuring internal accountability [8,16]. Governments often
approach this by either devolving additional responsibilities to
existing accountable authorities like municipalities, or forming
new responsible groups according to specific design rules [13].
Municipal or city authorities are an attractive target for devolution
because their use limits the number of layers of bureaucracy in the
institutional system [65]. They are internally accountable to both
citizens and higher levels of government, often have some degree
of experience with regulating aspects of electricity provision, and
have existing institutional capacity to govern. Whether nested,
multi-level governance of electricity is formalised through munic-
ipalities or other bodies, formally accountable authorities need to
commit sufficient financial and other resources to ensure that these
bodies have the full range of capacities required to govern
electricity.
At present, technical skills and knowledge related to the energy
system are highly centralised [66]. There are a number of reasons
for this: the energy system is quite complex and understanding it
often requires specific, technical knowledge; broader system actors
did not need to have specialized or context-specific knowledge
when the system was centralized and capacities are thus not well
developed [67] and; the existing profit-driven system provides
incentives for electricity actors to gain politically and financially by
restricting the amount of critical systems information that they
share publicly. For example, there have been reports of grid oper-
ators controlling both technical regulatory rule setting and critical
systems data in order to maintain political leverage in many loca-
tions [68e70]. A decentralised system will need to build technical
knowledge and skills amongst decentralised actors, not just the
previous incumbents.
Building electricity governance capacities at decentralised levels
is an inherently political act because it facilitates a reorganisation of
who owns, operates, and benefits e fiscally and socially e from the
electricity system [66,68]. However, these capacities are also
required to have a functional decentralised governance system. This
is part of the reasonwhy decentralised, grid connected systems are
also often described as, to greater or lesser degrees, more demo-
cratised [71]).
Decentralised governance of electricity will also require a strong
central coordination mechanism in order to ensure policy
3 RECs are also defined by restricted ownership rules (i.e., only natural persons,
SMEs, and local authorities), by primary motivations that extend beyond financial
profitability, and by local ownership.
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[67,72]. While much planning and balancing can be done at the
local level, increasing population density in urban areas and the
inherent intermittency of many renewables means that it remains
both beneficial and necessary to balance aggregated supply, stor-
age, and demand across larger areas [11]. For many countries, a
centralised coordination body is also necessary because of partici-
pation in international electricity markets and the need to respond
to electricity dynamics in other countries.
Whatever entity is assigned the coordination role, coordination
should not be confused with control. When central authorities
attempt to retain too much control, it can lead to public opposition
and can supress innovation and development [24,64]. At the same
time, there is fear amongst accountable central authorities that too
little control will lead to an electricity systemwhere those without
the capacity to develop decentralised resources will be left behind.
In effective electricity governance regimes, central coordinating
authorities will likely cede considerable autonomy to decentralised
authorities who are best placed to manage issues like siting, grid
access, and local balancing. However, there is also a need for a clear
structure for ensuring negotiation of best overall system func-
tioning that balances local and larger system concerns and ensures
policy coherence across scales.
5.3. Trustworthy and engaged governance
The OECD framework stipulates that good governance includes
broad stakeholder engagement, monitoring and evaluation,
consideration of trade-offs between actors, and integrity and
transparency. Good governance requires effective engagement of
stakeholders because many resource governance challenges cannot
be solved by any one actor working on their own. Smaller groups
working together in a coordinated fashion are often better able to
tackle large collective problems because they are able to integrate
local knowledge and contexts into their decisions. This also pro-
motes feelings of ownership over decisions that help to ensure
compliance with co-developed rules and regulations. In many
resource governance contexts, even if central authorities attempt to
make strict rules, the costs of monitoring, policing behaviour, and
sanctioning non-compliance are often much higher than taking a
more participatory approach [14,17,73,]. For this reason, much
decentralised resource governance emphasizes participation and
deliberation [48].
Participatory approaches are useful for managing trade-offs
between actors. In situations where individual, decentralised ac-
tors make decisions that impact the ability of others to use a
common resource, approaches that allow for the negotiation of
rules and trade-offs are desirable [14,75]. In Ontario, source water
protection planning used consensus-oriented decision making that
focused on dialogue and debate in order to negotiate compromises
[37]. While full deliberative processes are not always necessary to
resolve all trade-offs, there are a range of participatory models that
can be used to develop governance decisions. These models run the
gamut from information dissemination to consultation sessions to
full collaborative processes. The amount of participation required
often depends on the degree to which broad cooperation is
required in order to achieve desired outcomes [76].
More decentralised approaches are assumed to be more legiti-
mate and transparent. This is assumed to facilitate accountability
[24,48]. However, the openness of decentralised governance de-
pends very much on who sets the governing agenda and how
problems are defined. For example, in the Ontario case, the problem
was predefined by the responsible authority to focus only on the
protection of municipal drinking water supplies from a list of offi-
cial “threats”. While the accountable authority felt the need toconstrain the process to ensure it was politically palatable and
feasible, the restrictions on content meant that not everyone was
happy with the process. There are also outstanding water issues
that remain to be addressed because they were kept “off the table”
of collaborative decision making for political reasons (e.g.
contamination resulting from aggregate extraction) [37]. The gov-
ernment retained formal accountability but this was done at the
expense of consideration of the full range of relevant issues.
5.4. Trustworthy and engaged electricity governance
Drawing lessons from multi-level water governance, decen-
tralised electricity governance will benefit from the active inclusion
of a wide range of involved and impacted actors, consideration of
trade-offs, and attention to both monitoring and evaluation, and
integrity and transparency. Broad participation of the many new
actors who are involved in electricity systems will be required to
ensure broader system functioning. These actors will be able to
improve and legitimise decisions on, for example, the specific types
of capacity and expertise that need to be built and shared, who will
provide specific training, and how expertise will be shared [37,77].
Most visions for a decentralised grid rely heavily on smart me-
ters for monitoring, coordination and the balancing of trade-offs
[78]. However, smart metering is not a panacea [79]. The inclu-
sion of decentralised electricity producers in decision-making
processes should, if done properly, make it easier to ensure
compliance with technical system needs (i.e., distribution to, and
consumption from, the grid at appropriate times) that cannot be
managed solely through smart technologies. This also means
opening up formerly closed technical processes such as regulatory
code panels to a broader range of actors. This will facilitate the
broad inclusion of actors in developing the technical rules that
govern the emerging electricity system [69]. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, participatory governance can help facilitate social accep-
tance of the rules required to ensure a functional electricity grid
that can provide sufficient and reliable supply.
The EU Clean Energy Package [80] already provisions for some of
the governance components needed for a transparent and engaged
decentralised governance system. These provisions are in reference
to Renewable Energy Communities (RECs),3 but are relevant for
wider governance systems. In particular, RECs are defined by open,
non-discriminatory participation. Decision-making is also struc-
tured to avoid capture by any one single group. These provisions are
useful for ensuring transparency, sustained stakeholder engage-
ment, and overall levels of trust and social acceptance.
5.5. Efficient governance
The OECD efficiency governance dimension requires attention to
data and information, financing, regulatory frameworks and inno-
vation. Effective governance of any resource, decentralised or
otherwise, requires high quality information. In order for wider
groups of people to make good decisions, they need to have access
to relevant system information. In the Ontario example, this meant
information on surface and groundwater movement, contaminant
sources, and water demands. Depending on contextually-specific
conditions, information may be hidden or guarded to protect
certain interests (e.g. information on contaminants), or simply as a
result of bureaucratic tradition or inefficiency. Again, negotiating
release of these data can be a political process, especially when
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effectiveness of governance is limited by incomplete information.
Decentralised resource governance in particular is useful in
revealing data gaps. For example, the collaborative source water
protection exercise in Ontario revealed that many of the ground-
water resources in the province had not been adequately mapped.
For years, decisions had been made with incomplete information,
often to the detriment of actual outcomes [81]. In order to provide
the collaborative committees with sufficient information, the
province invested significant financial resources in groundwater
studies that, by many accounts, should have been completed years
prior [82]. The participation of previously unengaged actors also
brings more local and contextually-relevant information into the
governance process, improving data quality [48].
Within natural resource domains, there has been a tendency for
centralised governments to delegate responsibility for tasks
without the associated authority or financing required to make and
implement decisions. This usually leads to governance failures
whereby bodies responsible for certain governance functions are
unable to carry out them out effectively [83]. Municipalities in
particular often resist the devolution of responsibility because this
has historically happened without an associated devolution of re-
sources [84]. Devolution of responsibility thus needs to be
accompanied by appropriate changes to regulatory and policy
frameworks.
In decentralised water governance contexts, the innovative
governance principle manifests as a focus on reflexivity and
adaptive governance [23]. This requires specific capacities related
to program review and evaluation (discussed above), flexibility, and
experimentation [85]. In many cases, decentralised bodies are
better placed to be responsive to changing local conditions because
they are physically and institutionally closer to problem areas.
However, as withmany other capacities, the ability to be responsive
is not necessarily inherent and must be specifically developed and
financially supported [17].
Scholarship on resource governance reveals other capacities
required for multi-level governance systems to be innovative and
adaptive [23]. Decentralised authorities need to have the ability to
build and broker knowledge. In situations where resources are
decentralised and shaped by local contexts, decentralised gover-
nance bodies cannot feasibly have all the knowledge they need to
govern in-house. Local authorities need to be able to build, co-
produce, and draw upon networks to fill in knowledge and ca-
pacity gaps [86,87]. This reflexive and adaptive governance reflects
a continual tension between ensuring institutional consistency and
trust, and making changes to adapt to changing circumstances. The
ability to be flexible is aided by interrelated governance principles
including clear roles and responsibilities, participation, engage-
ment and transparency.
5.6. Efficient governance of electricity systems
Data and information, financing, regulatory frameworks and
innovation are also necessary in decentralised electricity gover-
nance systems. Data is crucial for decentralised energy systems and
has been the subject of significant academic interest in the context
of electricity supplies and smart technologies (e.g., Refs. [88,89]). In
particular, balancing decentralised, intermittent supplies over
broad, multi-level networks requires a great deal of coordination.
The ongoing decentralisation of supply to the centralised grid has
revealed just how important it is to have good, transparent data on
howmuch capacity the grid can handle, and the specifics of loading
[9,90].
In order for decentralised electricity governance to work well,
decentralisation of supply needs to be accompanied by openavailability of energy systems data [91]. This is less of a problem in
the European Union where regulations mandate ‘unbundling’ of
generation and distribution. Under current EU regulation, the
companies controlling information on, for example, how much
distributed generation the wires in a specific region can handle are
not the same companies competing with distributed generators for
supply contracts [92]. This reduces the incentive for companies to
withhold data in the name of competitive advantage. However,
there are many jurisdictions, particularly in North America, where
generation and supply are not completely separate. This has created
predictable political problemswith data availability. Even in the EU,
regulatory standard setting is often controlled by actors linked to
the centralised system and thus proceeds slowly as those actors act
to protect their financial interests - [69].
Issues of financing are also vital for decentralised energy sys-
tems. One of the key questions for regulators and grid operators
concerns who will pay for the system upgrades required to
decentralise supply [67]. As with other resource governance con-
texts, many visions for future grid charging regimes explore a
balance of financing responsibilities between grid users and the
responsible or accountable authority [90]. Grid charges are politi-
cally contentious, and many governments and regulators are
struggling to balance new charging regimes with social accept-
ability (e.g. Ref. [93]). This area is under researched but, as with
other aspects of energy systems change, the development of
financing rules will itself require effective, transparent and efficient
governance.
There are also specific legal and regulatory capacities that need
to be built specific to a decentralised electricity system [94]. There
are emerging models for rules and ‘smart’ contracts to simplify
integration of decentralised supply [95]. However, making good
decisions about how to use such contracts to support the larger
public good requires understanding how they work. This then
overlaps with knowledge and capacity building requirements for
effective governance, discussed above.
There are emerging examples of governments that are sup-
portive of decentralised generation beginning to develop policies
and regulations for nested, multi-level governance arrangements.
For example, the Netherlands approved a Climate Accord in June
2018with a non-binding provision that 50% of all renewable energy
moving forward would be community-owned. This was done to
facilitate social acceptance of the renewables infrastructure that
will be needed to meet aggressive Dutch climate targets. The
Climate Accord was preceded by an Environment and Planning Act,
to be entered into force in 2019, with specific provision allowing
local experimentation with electricity regulations. The Act requires
cooperation between municipalities and grid operators regarding
RE. Together, these two pieces of legislation both structure and
support decentralisation of energy in a manner than provisionally
supports clear chains of accountability, enshrined in regulation
[103].
Finally, decentralised governance bodies need to have the ability
to build and broker knowledge to accommodate the rapid pace of
change in the energy sector. This includes building and drawing
upon networks to both coordinate electricity systems and to fill in
knowledge and capacity gaps [6,96]. Related, these bodies must be
able to be reflexive and adaptable to changing conditions [97].
Given the rapidly changing energy system profile, the capacity of
decentralised bodies to experiment and innovatewithin their remit
will also help central coordinating bodies ensure that they are
meeting their responsibilities to govern energy in step with social
and technological developments. Many countries have experi-
mentation directives that allow a relaxation of regulatory rules
under controlled circumstances in order to test out different tech-
nological and regulatory arrangements (e.g. Ref. [9]). These types of
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ments, although there are arguments that they are too protective of
the status quo [9,68].
Regulatory experimentation should also not preclude or super-
sede action by decentralised governance bodies. Some municipal-
ities already have authority to make more consequential decisions
about electricity regulations. Locations where the grid and local
utility are under local public ownership often havemore freedom to
establish regulatory allowances like “net metering” where pro-
ducers are paid for electricity that they feed back in to the grid. This
is the case in Cape Town, South Africa where municipalities have a
significant influence over local utilities, and have established both
net metering, and an expansive plan for the development of
decentralised renewable energy [98].
6. Conclusions
The governance choices made by accountable authorities now
will define electricity systems for years to come. While there is
widespread acceptance that the future of energy will be at least
partially decentralised, there are conflicting views about how such
a system can and should be structured and governed [32,96,99].
Existing accountability mechanisms for electricity evolved in step
with centralised systems. As these systems change, there is a need
to adapt governance models to ensure overall electricity system
reliability, access and affordability [5]. While decentralisation of
grid-connected generation is a contemporary development in
many locations, decentralisation is an inherent part of other
resource systems such as water. There are valuable lessons to be
learned by examining best practices for nested, multi-level gover-
nance of natural resources.
As established, the comparison between grid-connected elec-
tricity and water is imperfect. This is especially true at present as
levels of prosumption and distributed ownership of electricity are
still limited. However, falling costs of technology, combined with
increasing concern over CO2 emissions, are leading to exponential
increases in deployment of decentralised generation technologies.
While developing a governance system that treats electricity as a
CPR may seem unnecessary under current conditions, socio-
technical trends indicate that this type of anticipatory governance
will help unlock the benefits of decentralisation, while facilitating
the broad engagement in the energy transition that is necessary to
facilitate social acceptance of the changes to come [4].
This analysis has revealed a number of insights specifically
relevant for addressing accountability in decentralised electricity
governance. As mentioned, decentralisation of at least some
governance functions will be necessary to optimise overall elec-
tricity system functioning, and promote public acceptance of RE
and engagement in demand-side activities. However, decentrali-
sation will be most appropriate if governing tasks are broadly
participatory, allocated to the lowest appropriate level, designed
with adequate internal accountability mechanisms, and with
attention to ensuring adequate capacities, financing and powers.
Transparent inclusion, coherence and data sharing mechanisms
are perhaps even more important for electricity than for water
because of ongoing challenges associated with storing large
amounts of electricity, and the consequent need to instantaneously
balance supply and demand. If the balance between participation
and system coordination is not well managed (i.e. if accountable
authorities tend toward too much control, if authorities unduly
restrict the scope of governance activities undertaken by collabo-
rative bodies), there is the potential for grid defection by those with
sufficient resources. That could mean that the burden of paying for
the costs of public grid infrastructure increasingly fall on the less
privileged who are unable to set up private electricity systems[100]. For accountable authorities, this is a balance that must be
carefully negotiated.
The level of uncertainty in the energy sector is unprecedented
[101]. There is no analogue for this level of long-term volatility in
water or other resource governance sectors. While the OECD
governance principles highlight innovation, transparency, adap-
tiveness and reflexivity, the degree to which decentralised elec-
tricity governance systems will need to assume these
characteristics is much more pressing. This makes an even stronger
case for addressing current governance gaps related to data avail-
ability, appropriate scaling, and system coherence. Knowledge,
capacities and skills development for the non-traditional actors
with roles to play in future electricity system governance is also
essential in this scenario.
The evolving nature of the electricity system has limited the
availability of empirical examples of decentralised electricity
governance for use in this paper. These systems are rapidly evolving
and practice-led (e.g. New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision
strategy; the U.K. Labour Party’s grid nationalisation strategy,
Bringing Energy Home). Even where these systems are more
advanced, academic literature is still lagging behind. For this
reason, the arguments presented in this paper are forward looking,
based on expertise in other sectors. However, this a research and
practical gap that, of necessity, will be addressed quickly.
Finally, the recommendations in this article are based on current
sociotechnical trajectories in the electricity sector toward increased
prosumption, consumer participation and broad decentralisation. It
is also possible that electricity systems of the future could look very
different, dependent upon technical advancement and upon his-
torical contexts, political trends, and existing institutional legacies.
Effective governance is, and will always be, context dependent. The
OECD principles in and of themselves are guidelines only. However,
attending to broad principles of good governance are one way to
achieve a “no regrets” approach to electricity system governance
under current conditions of high uncertainty.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Siddharth Sareen, Mathieu
Blondeel, and the participants of a 2019 Workshop in Bergen,
Norway on Accountability and Legitimacy in Energy Transitions
Governance for their valuable comments. The comments of two
anonymous reviewers have also been invaluable. Funding for the
Ontario case study was provided by research grants from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Standard
Research Grant 410-2011-2294, R. de Lo€e Principal Investigator)
and the Canadian Water Network (NCE-4000-2010, R. de Lo€e
Principal Investigator), and by a Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada Doctoral Fellowship (M.C. Brisbois)
References
[1] International Energy Agency, 2018 world energy outlook, 2018.
[2] Mudathir Funsho Akorede, Hashim Hizam, Edris Pouresmaeil, Distributed
energy resources and benefits to the environment, Renew. Sustain. Energy
Rev. 14 (2) (2010) 724e734.
[3] James Keirstead, Behavioural responses to photovoltaic systems in the UK
domestic sector, Energy Policy 35 (8) (2007) 4128e4141, https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.enpol.2007.02.019.
[4] Lucas Roth, Jens Lowitzsch, €Ozgür Yildiz, Alban Hashani, Does (Co-) owner-
ship in renewables matter for an electricity consumer’s demand flexibility?
Empirical evidence from Germany, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 46 (2018) 169e182.
[5] Andreas Goldthau, Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: scale,
decentralization and polycentrism, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 1 (2014) 134e140.
[6] Aleh Cherp, Jessica Jewell, Andreas Goldthau, Governing global energy:
systems, transitions, complexity, Glob. Policy 2 (1) (2011) 75e88.
[7] Frank Biermann, Aarti Gupta, Accountability and legitimacy in earth system
governance: a research framework, Ecol. Econ. 70 (11) (2011) 1856e1864.
[8] Michael Lockwood, Julie Davidson, Allan Curtis, Elaine Stratford, Rod Griffith,
M.C. Brisbois / Global Transitions 2 (2020) 16e2524Governance principles for natural resource management, Soc. Nat. Resour. 23
(10) (2010) 986e1001.
[9] Imke Lammers, Lea Diestelmeier, Experimenting with law and governance
for decentralized electricity systems: adjusting regulation to reality? Sus-
tainability 9 (2) (2017) 212.
[10] Rob C de Lo€e, James J. Patterson, Rethinking water governance: moving
beyond water-centric perspectives in a connected and changing world, Nat.
Resour. J. 57 (2017) 75.
[11] Ali M. Adil, Yekang Ko, Socio-technical evolution of decentralized energy
systems: a critical review and implications for urban planning and policy,
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 57 (2016) 1025e1037.
[12] Rod A.W. Rhodes, Understanding governance: ten years on, Organ. Stud. 28
(8) (2007) 1243e1264.
[13] Michael Lockwood, Julie Davidson, Allan Curtis, Elaine Stratford, Rod Griffith,
Multi-level environmental governance: lessons from Australian natural
resource management, Aust. Geogr. 40 (2) (2009) 169e186.
[14] E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Col-
lective Action, Cambridge University Press, ” Cambridge, 1990.
[15] Yannis Papadopoulos, Accountability and multi-level governance: more
accountability, less democracy?, in: Accountability and European Gover-
nance Routledge, 2014, 112e31.
[16] Neil Gunningham, The new collaborative environmental governance: the
localization of regulation, J. Law Soc. 36 (1) (2009) 145e166.
[17] Carina Wyborn, R Patrick Bixler, Collaboration and nested environmental
governance: scale dependency, scale framing, and cross-scale interactions in
collaborative conservation, J. Environ. Manag. 123 (2013) 58e67.
[18] Graham R. Marshall, Nesting, subsidiarity, and community-based environ-
mental governance beyond the local level, Int. J. Commons 2 (1) (2008)
75e97.
[19] Dave Huitema, Erik Mostert, Wouter Egas, Sabine Moellenkamp,
Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Resul Yalcin, Adaptive water governance: assessing the
institutional prescriptions of adaptive (Co-) management from a governance
perspective and defining a research agenda, Ecol. Soc. 14 (1) (2009) 26.
[20] David Roberts, Clean energy technologies threaten to overwhelm the grid.
Here’s how it can adapt. Vox (2018). December 2018, https://www.vox.com/
energy-and-environment/2018/11/30/17868620/renewable-energy-power-
grid-architecture.
[21] Matthew J. Burke, Jennie C. Stephens, Energy democracy: goals and policy
instruments for sociotechnical transitions, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 33 (2017)
35e48.
[22] Giorgos Kallis, Michael Kiparsky, Richard Norgaard, Collaborative gover-
nance and adaptive management: lessons from California’s CALFED water
program, Environ. Sci. Policy 12 (6) (2009) 631e643.
[23] James J. Patterson, Carl Smith, Jennifer Bellamy, Understanding enabling
capacities for managing the ‘wicked problem’ of nonpoint source water
pollution in catchments: a conceptual framework, J. Environ. Manag. 128
(2013) 441e452, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.05.033.
[24] Kees Van Kersbergen, Frans Van Waarden, “‘Governance’as a bridge between
disciplines: cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and
problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy, Eur. J. Political Res.
43 (2) (2004) 143e171.
[25] Karin Gottschall, Bernhard Kittel, Kendra Briken, Jan-Ocko Heuer, Sylvia Hils,
Sebastian Streb, Markus Tepe, Energy regulatory agencies, in: Public Sector
Employment Regimes: Transformations of the State, Palgrave Macmillan,
London, 2015, 167e96.
[26] Susan Park, Kramarz Teresa (Eds.), Global Environmental Governance and
the Accountability Trap, MIT Press, London, 2019.
[27] Oscar Widerberg, Philipp Pattberg, Accountability challenges in the trans-
national regime complex for climate change, Rev. Policy Res. 34 (1) (2017)
68e87.
[28] Jens Marquardt, How Power Shapes Energy Transitions in Southeast Asia: A
Complex Governance Challenge, Routledge, 2016.
[29] Benjamin K. Sovacool, An international comparison of four polycentric ap-
proaches to climate and energy governance, Energy Policy 39 (6) (2011)
3832e3844.
[30] François Bouffard, Daniel S. Kirschen, Centralised and distributed electricity
systems, Energy Policy 36 (12) (2008) 4504e4508.
[31] Robert O. Keohane, Global governance and democratic accountability, in:
David Held, Mathias Koenig Archbugi (Eds.), In Taming Globalization: Fron-
tiers of Governance, 2003, 130e59. Oxford: Polity.
[32] Richard Cowell, Decentralising energy governance? Wales, devolution and
the politics of energy infrastructure decision-making, Environ. Plan. C Soc.
Sci.: Polit. Space 35 (7) (2017) 1242e1263.
[33] Peter Rogers, Alan W. Hall, Effective Water Governance, vol. 7, Global water
partnership, 2003.
[34] Aziza Akhmouch, Francisco Nunes Correia, “The 12 OECD principles on water
governance e when science meets policy, Util. Policy 43 (2016) 14e20,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2016.06.004.
[35] OECD, OECD principles on water governance, 2015.
[36] Brisbois, Marie Claire, R.C. de Lo€e, Natural resource industry involvement in
collaboration for water governance: influence on processes and outcomes in
Canada, J. Environ. Plan. Manag. 60 (5) (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/
09640568.2016.1182899.
[37] Brisbois, Marie Claire, R.C. de Lo€e, State roles and motivations in collabora-
tive approaches to water governance: a power theory-based analysis,Geoforum 74 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.06.012.
[38] Integrated Environmental Planning Division, “White Paper on Watershed-
Based Source Protection.” Toronto, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10214/15837.
[39] Michael Bloor, Fiona Wood, Keywords in Qualitative Methods: A Vocabulary
of Research Concepts, Sage, 2006.
[40] Brisbois, Marie Claire, Rob C de Lo€e, Natural resource industry involvement
in collaboration for water governance: influence on processes and outcomes
in Canada, Environ. Plan. Manag. Online (2016).
[41] Michael Kiparsky, Anita Milman, Dave Owen, T Andrew Fisher, The impor-
tance of institutional design for distributed local-level governance of
groundwater: the case of California’s sustainable groundwater management
act, Water (2017), https://doi.org/10.3390/w9100755.
[42] Tomas M. Koontz, Toddi A. Steelman, JoAnn Carmin, Katrina Smith Korf-
macher, Cassandra Moseley, Craig W. Thomas, Collaborative Environmental
Management: what Roles for Government-1, Routledge, 2010.
[43] Christina Cook, Implementing drinking water security: the limits of source
protection, Wiley Interdiscip. Rev.: Water 3 (1) (2016) 5e12.
[44] J. Baird, J. Velaniskis, R. Plummer, J. Fitzgibbon, Political legitimacy and
collaborative water governance: an exploratory case study, Int. J. Water Gov.
2 (1) (2014).
[45] Ben Bradshaw, Questioning the credibility and capacity of community-based
resource management, Can. Geogr./Le Geographe Canadien 47 (2) (2003)
137e150.
[46] Beckley, M. Thomas, Diane Martz, Solange Nadeau, Ellen Wall, Bill Reimer,
Multiple capacities, multiple outcomes: delving deeper into the meaning of
community capacity, J. Rural Community Dev. 3 (3) (2009).
[47] Mae A. Davenport, Erin Seekamp, A multilevel community capacity model
for sustainable watershed management, Soc. Nat. Resour. 26 (9) (2013)
1101e1111.
[48] Chris Ansell, Alison Gash, Collaborative governance in theory and practice,
J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 18 (4) (2008) 543e571.
[49] Candace K. May, Visibility and invisibility: structural, differential, and
embedded power in collaborative governance of fisheries, Soc. Nat. Resour.
29 (7) (2016) 759e774.
[50] Brisbois, Marie Claire, C. Rob, de Lo€e, Natural resource industry involvement
in collaboration for water governance: influence on processes and outcomes
in Canada, J. Environ. Plan. Manag. 60 (5) (2017) 883e900, https://doi.org/
10.1080/09640568.2016.1182899.
[51] Brent Taylor, Rob de Loe, Kreutzwiser Reid, Henning Bjornlund, Local
groundwater management studies in Ontario, Canada: a case for retaining a
role for the state in community-based water research, Aust. J. Water Resour.
13 (1) (2009) 69e80.
[52] Ian Bache, Ian Bartle, Matthew Flinders, Greg Marsden, Blame games and
climate change: accountability, multi-level governance and carbon man-
agement, Br. J. Polit. Int. Relat. 17 (1) (2015) 64e88.
[53] Måns Nilsson, Tony Zamparutti, Jan Erik Petersen, Bj€orn Nykvist,
Rudberg Peter, Jennifer McGuinn, “Understanding policy coherence:
analytical framework and examples of sectoreenvironment policy in-
teractions in the EU, Environ. Policy Gov. 22 (6) (2012) 395e423, https://
doi.org/10.1002/eet.1589.
[54] Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan, Dorothy Thornton, Social license and
environmental protection: why businesses go beyond compliance, Law Soc.
Inq. 29 (2) (2004) 307e341.
[55] Timothy Moss, Maria Francesch-Huidobro, Realigning the electric city. Leg-
acies of energy autarky in Berlin and Hong Kong, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 11
(2016) 225e236, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.10.002.
[56] Harriet Bulkeley, Castan Broto Vanesa, Mike Hodson, Simon Marvin, Cities
and Low Carbon Transitions, Routledge, 2010.
[57] Siddharth Sareen, Baillie Douglas, Jürgen Kleinw€achter, Transitions to future
energy systems: learning from a community test field, Sustainability (2018),
https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124513.
[58] Gill Seyfang, Alex Haxeltine, Growing grassroots innovations: exploring the
role of community-based initiatives in governing sustainable energy tran-
sitions, Environ. Plan. C Govern. Policy 30 (3) (2012) 381e400.
[59] Thomas Hoppe, van Bueren Ellen, Guest editorial: governing the challenges
of climate change and energy transition in cities, SpringerOpen (2015).
[60] Harriet Bulkeley, Castan Broto Vanesa, Anne Maassen, Low-carbon transi-
tions and the reconfiguration of urban infrastructure, Urban Stud. 51 (7)
(2014) 1471e1486, https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098013500089.
[61] London City of 2019, “Energy for Londoners.”, 2019.
[62] Jonathan Rutherford, Olivier Coutard, Urban energy transitions: places,
processes and politics of socio-technical change, Urban Stud. 51 (7) (2014)
1353e1377.
[63] Stewart Fast, Warren Mabee, Jamie Baxter, Tanya Christidis, Liz Driver,
Stephen Hill, J.J. McMurtry, Melody Tomkow, Lessons learned from Ontario
wind energy disputes, Nat. Energy 1 (2) (2016) 15028.
[64] Daniel Rosenbloom, James Meadowcroft, The journey towards decarbon-
ization: exploring socio-technical transitions in the electricity sector in the
province of Ontario (1885e2013) and potential low-carbon pathways, En-
ergy Policy 65 (2014) 670e679.
[65] Anne M. Larson, C Ribot Jesse, Democratic decentralisation through a natural
resource lens: an introduction, Eur. J. Dev. Res. 16 (1) (2004) 1e25.
[66] Matthew J. Burke, Jennie C. Stephens, Political power and renewable energy
futures: a critical review, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. (2017), https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.018.
M.C. Brisbois / Global Transitions 2 (2020) 16e25 25[67] Nick Eyre, Sarah J Darby, Philipp Grünewald, Eoghan McKenna, Rebecca Ford,
Reaching a 1.5 C target: socio-technical challenges for a rapid transition to
low-carbon electricity systems, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A Math. Phys. Eng. Sci.
376 (2119) (2018) 20160462.
[68] Brisbois, Marie Claire, Powershifts: a framework for assessing the growing
impact of decentralized ownership of energy transitions on political deci-
sion-making, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 50 (2019) 151e161.
[69] Matthew Lockwood, Catherine Mitchell, Ricard Hoggett, Governance of in-
dustry rules and energy system innovation: the case of codes in great britain,
Util. Policy 47 (2017) 41e49.
[70] Ross Astoria, “On the radicality of New York’s reforming the energy vision,
Electr. J. 30 (5) (2017) 54e58, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2017.04.018.
[71] Thombs, P. Ryan, When democracy meets energy transitions: a typology of
social power and energy system scale, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 52 (2019)
159e168.
[72] Karoline S. Rogge, Florian Kern, Michael Howlett, Conceptual and empirical
advances in analysing policy mixes for energy transitions, Energy Res. Soc.
Sci. 33 (2017) 1e10.
[73] Arun Agrawal, Studying the commons, governing common-pool resource
outcomes: some concluding thoughts, Environ. Sci. Policy 36 (2014) 86e91.
[75] Jayanath Ananda, Wendy Proctor, Collaborative approaches to water man-
agement and planning: an institutional perspective, Ecol. Econ. 86 (2013)
97e106.
[76] Jens Newig, Oliver Fritsch, Environmental governance: participatory, multi-
leveleand effective? Environ. Policy Gov. 19 (3) (2009) 197e214.
[77] Svein Jentoft, In the power of power: the understated aspect of fisheries and
coastal management, Hum. Organ. (2007) 426e437.
[78] Simon Funcke, Dierk Bauknecht, Typology of centralised and decentralised
visions for electricity infrastructure, Util. Policy 40 (2016) 67e74.
[79] Maarten Wolsink, The research agenda on social acceptance of distributed
generation in smart grids: renewable as common pool resources, Renew.
Sustain. Energy Rev. 16 (1) (2012) 822e835.
[80] European Commission, Clean Energy for All Europeans, 2019.
[81] Steve Holysh, Richard Gerber, Groundwater knowledge management for
southern Ontario: an example from the Oak Ridges Moraine, Can. Water Res.
J./Revue Canadienne Des Ressources Hydriques 39 (2) (2014) 240e253.
[82] Rob C de Lo€e, Reid D. Kreutzwiser, Closing the groundwater protection
implementation gap, Geoforum 36 (2) (2005) 241e256.
[83] Jesse C. Ribot, Choosing representation: institutions and powers for decen-
tralized natural resources management, in: The Politics of Decentralization,
Routledge, 2012, pp. 100e120.
[84] Anne M. Larson, Fernanda Soto, Decentralization of natural resource gover-
nance regimes, Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 33 (2008) 213e239.
[85] Nathan Engle, Johns Owen, Carmen Lemos Maria, Donald Nelson, Integrated
and adaptive management of water resources: tensions, legacies, and the
next best thing, Ecol. Soc. 16 (1) (2011).
[86] Fikret Berkes, Devolution of environment and resources governance: trends
and future, Environ. Conserv. 37 (4) (2010) 489e500.
[87] Derek Armitage, Fikret Berkes, Nancy Doubleday, Adaptive Co-management:
Collaboration, Learning, and Multi-Level Governance, UBC Press, 2010.[88] Boardman, Ethan Clair, and Subrahmanyam Saraswati Venkata. 2015.
“Intelligent electrical distribution grid control system data.”Google Patents.
[89] F Richard Yu, Peng Zhang, Weidong Xiao, Paul Choudhury, Communication
systems for grid integration of renewable energy resources, IEEE Netw. 25
(5) (2011) 22e29.
[90] James Newcomb, Virginia Lacy, Lena Hansen, Mathias Bell, Distributed en-
ergy resources: policy implications of decentralization, Electr. J. 26 (8) (2013)
65e87.
[91] Jürgen Meister, Ihle Norman, Sebastian Lehnhoff, Mathias Uslar, 10 - smart
grid digitalization in Germany by standardized advanced metering infra-
structure and green button, in: Lisa Ann Lamont, B.T. Ali (Eds.), Application of
Smart Grid Technologies Sayigh, Academic Press, 2018, https://doi.org/
10.1016/B978-0-12-803128-5.00010-6, 347e71.
[92] Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt, Electricity market reform in the European
union: review of progress toward liberalization & integration, Energy J.
(2005) 11e41.
[93] Benjamin K. Sovacool, Rejecting renewables: the socio-technical impedi-
ments to renewable electricity in the United States, Energy Policy 37 (11)
(2009) 4500e4513.
[94] Karoline S. Rogge, Benjamin Pfluger, Frank W. Geels, Transformative policy
mixes in socio-technical scenarios: the case of the low-carbon transition of
the German electricity system (2010e2050), Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang.
(2018).
[95] Lee Thomas, Yue Zhou, Chao Long, Jianzhong Wu, Nick Jenkins, A general
form of smart contract for decentralized energy systems management, Nat.
Energy 4 (2) (2019) 140e149, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0317-7.
[96] Kristina Hojckova, Bj€orn Sanden, Ahlborg Helene, Three electricity futures:
monitoring the emergence of alternative system Architectures, Futures 98
(2018) 72e89, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2017.12.004.
[97] Johan Schot, W Edward Steinmueller, Framing Innovation Policy for Trans-
formative Change: Innovation Policy 3.0, SPRU Science Policy Research Unit,
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 2016.
[98] Sylvy Jaglin, Urban energy policies and the governance of multilevel issues in
Cape town, Urban Stud. 51 (7) (2014) 1394e1414.
[99] Johan Lilliestam, Susanne Hanger, Shades of green: centralisation, decen-
tralisation and controversy among European renewable electricity visions,
Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 17 (2016) 20e29.
[100] Lucy Baker, Jon Phillips, Tensions in the transition: the politics of electricity
distribution in South Africa, Environ. Plan. C Soc. Sci.: Polit. Space 37 (1)
(2019) 177e196.
[101] International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2019, 2019.
[102] S.N. Singh, Østergaard Jacob, Naveen Jain, Distributed generation in power
systems: an overview and key issues, in: Proceedings of the 24th Indian
Engineering Congress. Kerala, India, 2009.
[103] Brisbois, Marie Claire. n.d. “Rescaling, reorganization and battles for influ-
ence: shifting political power in an era of electricity decentralization.”.
[104] J. Innes, S. Connick, D. Booher, et al., Collaborative water management in the
CALFED Bay-Delta program, J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 73 (2) (2007) 195e210.
[105] J. Kooiman. Governing As Governance., SAGE Publications Ltd., London,
United Kingdom, 2003.
